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I. INTRODUCTION
"If I were as fat as you, I'd hang myself."'
"Pound for pound, the American bias against fat people may
be the most socially acceptable prejudice left. It is no longer
considered acceptable to discriminate against minorities, wo-
men and the disabled. But in a society that... scorns the portly,
overweight people continue to face ridicule and closed doors."2
Obesity and overweight discrimination has often been described
as the last safe area of bigotry and the final acceptable form of
discrimination in America.3 The myths about overweight indi-
viduals abound: they are lazy, slow, and lack energy and they are
not good employees because they will drive customers away.4
I Gordon B. Block, So Long, Girth Control, HEALTH, Feb. 1991, at 70 (quoting
famous playwright George Bernard Shaw).
2 Aaron Epstein, Courts Review Bias Against the Overweight, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Jan. 9, 1994, at A2.
9 Janet Cawley, Last Target of Legal Bigotry: Obesity, CHI. TRiB., May 12, 1993, at
Al (quoting Brooklyn Assemblyman Dan Feldman). In her article Nature or Nur-
ture, Lifestyle or Fate: Employment Discrimination Against Obese Workers, Patricia Hart-
nett quotes another commentator, Sally E. Smith, in describing the reaches of
this discrimination:
Fat people are discriminated against in employment, in that they
are denied employment, denied promotions and raises, denied
benefits, and sometimes fired, all because of their weight. Fat peo-
ple are discriminated against in education, in that they are not ac-
cepted into graduate programs, and are harassed and expelled
because of their weight. Fat people are denied access to adequate
medical care, in that they are denied treatment, misdiagnosed,
harassed, and treated as though every medical condition, from a
sore throat to a broken bone, is a weight-related condition. Fat
people are denied access to public accommodations, such as public
transportation, airline travel, theaters, and restaurants because seat-
ing is not available for them.
Patricia Harmett, Nature or Nurture, Lifestyle or Fate: Employment Discrimination
Against Obese Workers, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 807, 808 n.4 (1993) (quoting Sally E. Smith,
Sizism-One of the Last "Safe" Prejudices, CAL. Now ACTrVST, July 1990, at 1).
4 Mary Vobril, Battling Fat Bias in the Workplace, NEWSDAY, Dec. 5, 1993, at 95.
WEIGHT-BASED DISCRIMINATION
Obese and overweight people are beginning to fight this dis-
crimination, however, and while many would say there is no
legal remedy if they are discriminated against, others think
these individuals should have a claim for illegal discrimination.5
The airline industry is not immune to the issues involving
overweight and obese individuals. In the context of overweight
individuals, the airline industry encounters these issues when
making hiring decisions for flight attendants. Furthermore,
weight discrimination becomes an issue for airlines when they
must accommodate and properly service an obese passenger
while also insuring that the other passengers on the flight are
comfortable and safe. This Comment will analyze the issue of
weight-based discrimination in the airline industry and the pos-
sible legal options for eliminating the underlying discrimination
and disparate treatment that exist. The focus will be on the two
groups who are particularly susceptible to this form of discrimi-
nation: flight attendants and obese passengers.6
II. FACTS ABOUT OVERWEIGHT AND OBESE PEOPLE
A. DISTINCTION BETWEEN OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY
The terms "overweight" and "obese" do not have the same
meaning. An overweight person is an individual who weighs
more than the average person of that height and sex according
5 Julie M. Buchannan, Do the Overweight Have Rights?, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL,
June 7, 1993, at llB.
6 Pilots have been excluded from the scope of this Comment, in part, because
the employer airline seems to have a valid reason for limiting the height and
weight of pilots: the cockpit can only be a certain height and width. In legal
terms, the airline has the valid defense of business necessity when dealing with
the situation of pilots.
In Boyd v. Ozark Air Lines, 419 F. Supp. 1061 (E.D. Mo. 1976), the district court
found that Ozark had met the burden of establishing that a height requirement
for pilots is a business necessity. Id. at 1064. The court agreed with the fact that
the cockpit can only accommodate a certain range of heights because pilots have
to have the ability to use all of the instruments and still be in a position to see out
the window. Id. Because of this evidence, the court agreed that a height require-
ment was definitely job related. Id. at 1065.
Presumably, the logic used by the court in Boyd would apply to weight require-
ments for pilots as well, although there are no cases that directly address this
issue. Nevertheless, the business necessity defense appears to apply more readily
to pilots than it would to flight attendants and, therefore, this Comment will
focus on the flight attendant position and possible weight discrimination issues in
this context.
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to established insurance tables.7 Obesity, on the other hand, is
generally defined as "a bodily condition marked by excessive
generalized disposition and storage of fat: corpulence."8 There
are two basic categories of obesity: significant obesity and mor-
bid obesity.9 Significant obesity is used to define a person whose
weight ranges from twenty to thirty percent above the average or
ideal weight.1 ° Morbid obesity is the term used to describe a
weight that is either 100 pounds over the average weight for a
given group or twice the average weight for that particular
group.11 In this Comment, there will be no distinction drawn
between significant and morbid obesity; both terms will be in-
cluded in the single word "obesity."12
B. CAUSES OF OBESITY
Obesity is often perceived as a voluntary condition that is
caused by over-indulgence, but this is not necessarily the case.13
In fact, obese individuals may actually consume fewer calories
than non-obese people consume. 4 Some studies have con-
cluded that an obese condition is often the result of a combina-
tion of genetic influences and environmental factors. In
addition, an individual's metabolic rate has been hypothesized
7 See Donald L. Bierman, Employment Discrimination Against Overweight Individu-
als: Should Obesity Be a Protected Classification?, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 951, 956
(1990). The average or ideal weight is the weight associated with the lowest mor-
tality rates for various height and weight combinations as recorded by insurance
companies.
8 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (Unabridged 1981).
9 A third category of obesity ("serious" or "gross obesity"), which falls between
significant and morbid obesity, is sometimes referred to by authors. This is de-
fined as weighing 30% to 35% over the ideal weight. See, e.g., Karen M. Kramer &
Arlene B. Mayerson, Obesity Discrimination in the Workplace: Protection Through a
Perceived Disability Claim Under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act, 31 CAL. W. L. REv. 41, 42 n.9 (1994).
10 Bierman, supra note 7, at 956. For purposes of this Comment, only signifi-
cant and morbid obesity will be considered.
1 Id. (citing William E. Straw, The Dilemma of Obesity, 72 POSTGRADUATE MED.
No. 1, 121-26 (1982)).
12 The distinction between overweight and obesity will, however, be used and it
will be important to consider the differences between these two conditions and
the difficulty in applying these terms separately during the discussion of obesity
being viewed as a handicap. See discussion infra part V.A.
13 One commentator stated that "[t]o conclude that obesity is caused by over-
eating is no more meaningful than concluding that alcoholism is caused by too
much drinking." Hartnett, supra note 3 at 808.
14 See Hartnett, supra note 3, at 810 (citing Born To Be Fat?, U.S. NEws & WORLD
REP., May 14, 1990, at 62).
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to partially control that person's weight. 15 The bottom line is
that the underlying causes of obesity can vary from person to
person and the single, common cause of obesity is, in general,
unknown. 16 The results of the many studies done on overweight
and obese conditions, though inconclusive as to the exact
causes, seem to support a general theory that obesity is an im-
mutable characteristic.
C. PROBLEMS FACING OVERWEIGHT AND OBESE INDIDUALS
There is little question that society as a whole, whether con-
sciously or unconsciously, discriminates against overweight and
obese individuals.' 7 At an early age, fat people have been stig-
matized and the effects can lead to a feeling of low self-esteem
for an entire lifetime.' 8 An obese person is often viewed as re-
sponsible for their condition which, though true in some situa-
tions, is not always the case, because obesity is often an
immutable characteristic.
The stigma often attached to overweight and obese individu-
als can lead to a wide range of health problems and negative
attitudes. In the case of an overweight individual, which is usu-
ally viewed as a mutable characteristic, anorexia nervosa may re-
sult.19 Another illness that may result from a desire to be thin is
bulimia, a disease that occurs when an individual consumes
large amounts of food and then forces himself or herself to
vomit.20 In the obesity context, a survey in 1991 demonstrated
that ten to twelve percent of the people surveyed would choose
15 Denise Grady, Is Losing Weight a Losing Battle?, TIME, Mar. 7, 1988, at 59.
Other commentators, however, have stated that studies about the relationship
between metabolism and weight have failed to establish any correlation between
the two. See Bierman, supra note 7, at 957.
16 Jane 0. Baker, The Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Protection for Victims of Weight
Discrimination?, 29 UCLA L. REv. 947, 949-50 (1982).
17 Donna M. Ryan, a long time member of the National Association to Advance
Fat Acceptance (NAAFA), has recounted many stories from members of the
group about how total strangers come up to the grocery carts of fat people, take
food out of their carts, and tell the individual that they do not need certain items.
See Cawley, supra note 3, at Al.
18 See generally Scott Petersen, Discrimination Against Overweight People: Can Soci-
ety Still Get Away with It?, 30 GONZ. L. REv. 105, 106 (1994/95).
19 Paula B. Stolker, Weigh My Job Performance, Not My Body: Extending Title VII to
Weight-Based Discrimination, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 223, 227 (1992).
20 Id.
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to abort a fetus if there was a prenatal test that determined that
the child would be obese.21
Overweight and obese people are fighting back by forming
organizations and filing lawsuits that arise from situations involv-
ing explicit weight discrimination. The National Association to
Advance Fat Acceptance (NAAFA) is a non-profit organization
founded in 1969 that is dedicated to helping fat people become
accepted. It is interesting to note that NAAFA promotes the
use of the descriptive term "fat" and one of the strongest advo-
cates for size acceptance, Natalie Allon, often uses this term in
her writings.2 3 NAAFA has become increasingly active in sup-
porting legislation to protect the rights of fat people and the
organization even advocates overweight and obesity becoming
political issues in election campaigns.2 4 In addition to NAAFA,
the filing of private lawsuits to combat weight discrimination has
been met with occasional success. 25
As stated earlier, the airline industry must confront over-
weight issues when hiring employees, especially flight attend-
ants. In addition, the issue of obesity is seen in accommodating
obese passengers on flights. In order to combat weight-based
discrimination in the industry, fat individuals could attempt to
classify their weight problem as a disability, and seek statutory
protection to prevent this discrimination from continuing. The
analysis in this Comment will begin with flight attendants, then
shift to obese passengers, and, finally, determine what statutory
protection might be available for both of these groups if an
overweight or obese condition is recognized as a handicap.
III. FLIGHT ATTENDANTS
A. HISTORY
In the competitive air travel market that resulted after World
War II, airlines began to advertise their flight attendants as sex
objects and many companies organized entire advertising cam-
21 Hartnett, supra note 3, at 812 (citing Karen Klinger, Your Health: Few Would
Abort Cystic Fibrosis Affected Fetus, UPI, Aug. 31, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, UPI File).
22 See id. at 809 n.9; Bierman, supra note 7, at 958 n.54.
23 See Kramer & Mayerson, supra note 9, at 41 n.1.
24 Hartnett, supra note 3, at 41 n.9.
25 See discussion infra part VA.1. of Cook v. Rhode Island, Dept. of Mental
Health, Retardation, & Hosps., 10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that plaintiffs
obesity constituted a disability under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and awarding
$100,000 in compensatory damages).
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paigns around this idea. Because of these marketing tech-
niques, airlines began enforcing age, weight, and height
standards in order to insure that flight attendants fit within the
"sex object" image. 6 Some of the advertising campaigns that
resulted were Braniff's "Air Strip" (requiring flight attendants to
change into various costumes), National Airline's "Fly Me-I'm
Cheryl," and Southwest Airline's "Love" campaign (requiring
flight attendants to serve "love potions" and "love bites") .27
B. LAWSUITS BY FLIGHT ATTENDANTS UNDER TITLE VII
The Civil Rights Act (the Act) was passed in 1964 and Tide VII
of the Act (Tide VII) prohibits discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex,28 or national origin.2 9 In the 1970s, cases
arose under Tide VII that challenged the airlines' hiring prac-
tices for flight attendants. These cases challenged the "female
only" distinction of flight attendants,30 the requirement that
26 Toni S. Reed, Comment, Flight Attendant Furies: Is Title VII Really the Solution
to Hiring Policy Problems, 58J. AIR L. & COM. 267, 271 (1992). Ms. Reed's com-
ment more fully details the history of flight attendants and analyzes lawsuits
under Title VII brought by flight attendants to challenge mandatory appearance
standards of airlines.
27 Id. According to another author, these sex campaigns of the 1970s are con-
vincing evidence of the way airlines exploited women and theirfemininity. Due
to pressure from the flight attendants who organized the influential group Stew-
ardesses for Women's Rights in order to eliminate chauvinistic ad campaigns,
and the public opinion associated with an increased awareness of a woman's
rights in the workplace, airlines were forced to move to more subtle campaigns
which capitalized on women as flight attendants. See Pamela Whitesides, Flight
Attendant Weight Policies: A Title VII Wrong Without a Remedy, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 175,
187 (1990).
28 Interestingly, the word "sex" in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act was actually
added as an attempt by Howard Worth Smith (known asJudge Smith) and other
Southern Democrats to defeat passage of the Act in the House of Representa-
tives. This attempt obviously failed and the inclusion of the word "sex" in the
statute led to significant litigation, which insured equal treatment of women in
employment situations. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILLIP P. FRICKEY, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
15 (2d ed. 1995).
29 Specifically, Title VII mandates that:
It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer: (1) to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(2) (1994).
so See Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 950 (1971).
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flight attendants remain unmarried,"1 and, most importantly for
this Comment, the weight requirements for flight attendants.
3 2
1. Female Only Positions
In Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,33 the plaintiff
sought to invalidate the defendant airline's policy of hiring only
women as flight attendants on the basis that this policy was sex
discrimination in violation of Title VII. Celio Diaz applied for a
job as a flight attendant with Pan American Airline in 1967. He
was rejected, however, because the airline limited its hiring for
the position to females. After the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission (EEOC) failed to resolve the dispute through
voluntary conciliation, Diaz filed a class action in United States
district court, alleging that Pan American had refused to hire
him on the basis of sex, a violation of Title VII.34
At trial, Pan American admitted that it had a policy of restrict-
ing its hiring for flight attendant positions to females. 35 The is-
sue, therefore, was whether being a female was a bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ),6 which, if proved by Pan
American, would provide a defense for the practice. The trial
court found that passengers on Pan American flights preferred
female attendants to males.3 8 It also determined that Pan Amer-
ican's experience with both male and female flight attendants
demonstrated that the performance of the female attendants
was superior to males in all aspects of customer service.3 9 Fi-
nally, on the basis of the expert testimony of a psychiatrist, the
court found that females were better suited to care for the
31 See Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 991 (1971); see discussion infra part III.B.2.
32 SeeJarrell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. Va. 1977); see
discussion infra part III.B.3.
33 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971).
34 Id. at 386.
35 Id.
3 The defense of a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) is a statuto-
rily created defense that is found in Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2) (e)
(1994). Essentially, this defense is available to defendant employers in disparate
treatment cases (intentional discrimination of a protected class) if the employer
can show that "the essence of the business operation would be undermined by
not hiring a member of one sex [or national origin or religion] exclusively." Diaz,
442 F.2d at 388. It is important to note that race is never a permissible distinction
for a BFOQ defense.
37 Diaz, 442 F.2d at 388.




unique psychological needs of passengers. 4° Diaz filed a timely
appeal of the trial court's decision in the Fifth Circuit.4'
The Fifth Circuit started its analysis by noting that the essen-
tial function of an airline is to safely transport its passengers.42
Because of this primary function, the court determined that the
presence of male flight attendants would not minimize the abil-
ity of the airline to provide safe transportation. 43 The Fifth Cir-
cuit concluded by holding that "in order to rely on the bona
fide occupational qualification exception an employer has the
burden of proving that he had reasonable cause to believe ...
that all or substantially all [men] would be unable to perform
safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved."44 Thus, the
Fifth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the eviden-
tiary findings did not justify the discrimination practiced by Pan
American.45
2. Single Status
In Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc.,46 decided in the same year
that Diaz struck down the sex barrier, the plaintiff challenged
the requirement that female flight attendants remain unmar-
ried. The plaintiff was employed by United Airlines as a flight
attendant. Her employment was terminated on June 19, 1966
because she violated a company policy that required flight at-
tendants to remain unmarried. Although United employed
both male and female attendants, this restrictive policy had
never been enforced against males. After filing a charge with
the EEOC and receiving her notice of right to sue, Sprogis com-
menced her lawsuit in November 1968.47
The trial court held that the discharge of Sprogis was due to
her recent marriage and this action constituted an unlawful em-
ployment practice.4 8 The court granted the plaintiffs motion
for summary judgment and concluded that she was entitled to
reinstatement. 49 In addition, the court ordered United to pay
4o Id.
41 Id. at 385.
42 Id. at 388.
43 Id.
- Id. (citing Weeks v. Southern Bell Tele. & Tele. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir.
1969)).
45 Id.
- 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971).
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compensation for all wages lost from the time of her illegal dis-
charge to the time of her reinstatement.50 United perfected an
interlocutory appeal to the Seventh Circuit and all proceedings
were stayed, pending the outcome of this appeal. 51
The Seventh Circuit held that this rule violated Tide VII be-
cause there was one standard for men and another for women. 2
As in Diaz, United claimed a BFOQ defense, contending that
the unmarried status of female flight attendants was one of the
essential functions of a flight attendant's duties.55 The court re-
jected this BFOQ assertion by United because the airline failed
to present even a "reasonably limited connection" between job
performance and the no marriage rule.5 4 "United has failed to
explain why marriage should affect female flight cabin attend-
ants' ability to meet the requirements of that position while at
the same time leaving unimpaired the capabilities of male flight
personnel, particularly [flight attendants]. 55
3. Weight Requirements
In keeping with the flight attendant "sex object" theme,56 air-
lines adopted height and weight requirements for their flight
attendants. Not only were these standards applied in hiring
practices but the airlines also used these height and weight max-
imums for disciplining and terminating flight attendants who
exceeded the maximum weight for a given height.57 Some air-
lines have justified these height and weight requirements on the
basis of safety, because flight attendants must be able to operate
emergency equipment or assist passengers in a crash landing.58
Other airline companies maintain that these are appearance
standards and are necessary to establish and fortify the image of
a professional air carrier with the general public. 9
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 1198.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 1199.
55 Id.
56 See discussion supra part III.A.
57 As discussed by Ms. Reed in her comment, the airlines have become increas-
ingly willing to relax weight standards. In 1991, for example, American Airlines
increased its weight allowances in all height categories and added weight to re-
flect increases in age. Reed, supra note 26, at 301.
58 Id. at 290.
59 Id.; see also Whitesides, supra note 27, at 198.
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Although there have been several challenges against the air-
lines' weight requirements, courts have upheld them under a
several different theories. One theory on which courts have
based their decisions is that these programs are valid business
practices under Title VII. For example, in Jarrell v. Eastern Air
Lines, Inc.,60 the court held that Eastern's weight program61 did
not constitute discrimination, on its face nor in its effect, be-
cause weight is deemed a mutable characteristic. 62 Also, in In re
National Airlines, Inc.,63 the court found mandatory weight re-
quirements non-discriminatory under the language of Title VII
because they applied equally to both men and women.
64
A second theory on which courts base their decisions uphold-
ing weight requirements for flight attendants is that there is no
constitutional right violated by the imposition of these pro-
grams. In Cox v. Delta Air Lines,65 the court upheld the weight
program as valid because weight, since it can be altered, is not
60 430 F. Supp 884 (E.D. Va. 1977).
61 The following is the weight program Eastern Airlines had in place at the
time of trial:
HEIGHT-WEIGHT CHART FOR FEMALE FLIGHT ATTENDANT
Height Minimum Weight Maximum Weight
62" 100 lbs. 115 lbs.
63" 104 lbs. 119 lbs.
64" 108 lbs. 123 lbs.
65" 112 lbs. 127 lbs.
66" 116 lbs. 131 lbs.
67" 120 lbs. 135 lbs.
68" 122 lbs. 140 lbs.
69" 124 lbs. 145 lbs.
HEIGHT-WEIGHT CHART FOR MALE FLIGHT ATTENDANT
Height Minimum Weight Maximum Weight
66" 124 lbs. 156 lbs.
67" 128 lbs. 161 lbs.
68" 132 lbs. 166 lbs.
69" 136 lbs. 171 lbs.
70" 140 lbs. 176 lbs.
71" 144 lbs. 181 lbs.
72" 148 lbs. 186 lbs.
73" 152 lbs. 191 lbs.
Jarre1 430 F. Supp. at 888.
62 Id at 892.
63 434 F. Supp. 269 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
64 Id. at 275.
65 553 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1977).
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an immutable characteristic and, therefore, it is not protected
by the Constitution."6 In addition, the court in Cox seemed will-
ing to validate these weight requirements on the basis that they
are merely grooming standards and, thus, do not rise to the
level of constitutional protection.6 7
At least one court, however, found an airline's weight require-
ment program invalid. In Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, Inc.,'
the plaintiff was suspended and eventually terminated from her
flight attendant position because her weight exceeded the maxi-
mum permitted for her height under Continental's program.
Gerdom challenged the policy of Continental on the basis of sex
discrimination, in violation of Title VII. 69 After judgment was
entered against Gerdom in the district court, she appealed to
the Ninth Circuit. 70
The Ninth Circuit held that Continental's weight program vi-
olated Title VII.71 The court found the program invalid because
only women were required to adhere to maximum weights and
heights.72 The court rejected Continental's argument that the
program was a grooming standard and distinguished this situa-
tion from other grooming cases because Continental's weight
program imposed a greater burden on one sex, females, than
the other.73
In summary, courts, for the most part have upheld height and
weight requirements as valid, although the decisions are neither
consistent nor predictable. Airlines, however, because of the
significant number of lawsuits and the resulting big dollar settle-
ments, have been increasingly willing to relax their weight re-
quirements.7 4 Nevertheless, the courts have been reluctant to
classify these weight programs as discrimination claims arising
66 Id. at 101.
67 Whitesides, supra note 27, at 209.
68 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
69 Id. at 603.
70 Id. at 604.
71 Id. at 605.
72 Id. at 610 ("We hold that Continental's policy of requiring an exclusively
female category of flight attendants, and no other employees, to adhere to the
weight restrictions at issue here constitutes discriminatory treatment on the basis
of sex").
73 Id. at 605-06 ("In those [grooming standard] cases, unlike this case, no sig-
nificantly greater burden was . . . imposed on either sex; that is the key
consideration").
74 Reed, supra note 26, at 301. Ms. Reed uses American Airlines, which histori-




under Title VI 75 and have upheld weight requirements as valid
grooming standards, as long as these apply equally to both
sexes.76 In other words, given the diversity of court decisions
and the commentary written in this area, Title VII does not ap-
pear to be the proper statute for flight attendants to fight
weight-based discrimination in the airline industry.7 As long as
these weight requirements are applied equally to men and wo-
men, courts appear willing to uphold them as valid and find
these non-discriminatory under the language of Title VII.
IV. OBESE PASSENGERS
A. OBESITY IN AMERICA
The number of obese individuals in American society is ever
increasing. In 1990, it was estimated that nearly twenty percent
of the population fit within the definition 7 of obesity.79 In
1994, the number increased and nearly one-third of all adults in
the United States were estimated to be obese.8 ° In addition,
more than forty percent of the American population was consid-
ered at least ten percent overweightjust four years ago.81 These
recent facts are convincing evidence that a substantial portion of
the population remains either overweight or obese.
As seen, weight-based discrimination is common in today's so-
ciety8 2 and, with commercial air travel being more popular than
ever, it is obvious that hundreds, if not thousands, of obese pas-
sengers board commercial flights every day. It seems safe to as-
sume that these individuals experience some of the same biases
that are often associated with obesity and which have been de-
tailed by various NAAFA members.8 3 It is difficult for obese
75 SeeJarrell, 430 F. Supp. at 884; In re Nat'l Airlines, 434 F. Supp. at 269.
76 See, e.g., Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
77 See, e.g., Whitesides, supra note 27, at 200 (" [T] raditional Title VII judicial
analyses based solely on the difference in treatment among a narrow class of
employees will not reach some Title VII wrongs .... "); Reed, supra note 26, at
339 ("[I] t is not clear that Title VII can adequately address all of the concerns of
flight attendants about hiring standards .... "); TammyJulian, How Title VII Has
Affected the Airline Industry, 11 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 281 (1992).
78 See, discussion supra part II.A.
79 Bierman, supra note 7, at 957 n.46 (citing a telephone conversation with
William E. Straw, a family practice physician in Palo Alto, Cal.).
80 Robert Kuczmarski, Increasing Prevalence of Overweight Among U.S. Adults, 272
JAMA 205 (1994).
81 Stolker, supra note 19, at 228.
82 See discussion supra part I.
83 See note 17 supra.
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ticket purchasing citizens to break the stereotypes so often asso-
ciated with fat people and be properly serviced by airlines.8 4
The issues facing obese passengers obviously go beyond the lim-
its of the employer-employee relationship seen in the context of
flight attendants, which makes it much more difficult for obese
passengers to receive the services afforded to other passengers.
B. LACK OF STATUTORY PROTEcrION
Tide VII does not provide any express protection for passen-
gers because it is confined to employment situations. 85 Even if
Tide VII was extended beyond the employment context to cover
airline passengers, it would still be insufficient protection
against weight discrimination because no where in Tide VII is
"weight" used as a protected characteristic. 86 The challenges of
airline weight programs by flight attendants under Title VII
have been met with less than satisfactory results, suggesting that
the Civil Rights Act is not the statute that can eliminate weight
discrimination in the airline industry.8 7 The bottom line is that
if Title VII cannot be used by flight attendants as protection, it
certainly is not the proper statute for obese passengers to seek
redress for any discrimination they face. Because of the difficul-
ties with Tide VII affording adequate protection against weight
discrimination, it is necessary for both flight attendants and pas-
sengers to focus their attention away from Title VII and look to
other statutes as viable means to end discrimination based on
weight. Part V takes a detailed look at one possible solution or
alternative for these groups: overweight and obesity being classi-
fied as a handicap.
84 NAAFA has advised its members that one alternative is to travel on the least
crowded flights, so that the airline has the option of accommodating them with
an additional seat. This alternative was also suggested in the Canadian legislature
in the early 1980s and a bill was proposed that would require commercial airlines
to provide free extra seats to passengers who were either overweight or disabled.
See Shari J. Ronkin, Private Rights in Public Places: A Weighty Issue, 48 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 649, 668 (1994).
85 See note 29 supra.
86 "It shall be unlawful... to discriminate against any individual... because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000(e) (2) (1994).
87 See, e.g., Hartnett, supra note 3, at 817 ("Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
provides little protection for obese plaintiffs who allege that an employer has
discriminated against them"); Stolker, supra note 19, at 249 ("The way the law
stands today, employers can subjectively discriminate against the overweight by
implementing their own standards of beauty or acceptability, and most employ-
ees have no remedy").
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V. LEGAL REMEDIES FOR WEIGHT-BASED
DISCRIMINATION
A. OVERWEIGHT AND OBEsIT. A HANDICAP?
1. The Cook Decision
Although classifying obesity as a handicap might appear to
stretch the definition of the word to its outer limits, at least one
court has ruled that morbid obesity can be classified as a disabil-
ity.8 8 In a case of first impression for the First Circuit, the court
ruled that the anti-discrimination protection of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act)8 9 applied to an individual
who suffered from morbid obesity.
The plaintiff, Bonnie Cook, had been employed by the de-
fendant, who operated the Ladd Center, a residential facility for
retarded individuals, as an institutional attendant. The Ladd
Center was under the jurisdiction of Rhode Island's Mental
Health, Retardation, and Hospitals (MHRH). Cook worked at
the facility from 1978 to 1980, and again from 1981 to 1986.
Both times that Cook left her employment, it was voluntary and
she departed with an unblemished work record.
Cook reapplied for an identical position with MHRH in 1988
and, at that time, she stood 5'2" and weighed in excess of 320
pounds. 90 She was accepted on the condition that she complete
a routine physical examination. The nurse who conducted the
exam (an MHRH employee) concluded that Cook was morbidly
obese 91 but found no limitations on her ability to complete all of
the job requirements.
Despite the fact that Cook passed the pre-employment physi-
cal, MHRH refused to hire her. MHRH asserted two reasons for
balking at Cook's rehiring. First, it claimed that Cook's condi-
tion compromised her ability to evacuate patients in case of an
emergency. Second, MHRH stated that her morbid obesity put
her at greater risk of developing serious ailments, a fact that
would, MHRH speculated, increase the likelihood of workers'
compensation claims and promote absenteeism. When Cook
88 Cook v. Rhode Island, Dept. of Mental Health, Retardation & Hosps., 10
F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993).
89 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
90 Cook had always been overweight and this appears to have been the case
during her previous two employments with MHRH. Although she was over-
weight, she had not attained this state of morbid obesity until she reapplied in
1988. See Cook, 10 F.3d at 20 n.1.
91 See discussion supra part II.A (defining morbid obesity).
2171996]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AMD COMMERCE
failed to satisfy the request by MHRH to reduce her weight "to
something less than three hundred pounds,"92 she was denied
employment.
Cook did not go away quietly. She sued MHRH in federal
district court under the Rehabilitation Act, alleging that she was
the victim of discrimination due to her obesity. She proceeded
under a perceived disability theory,93 contending that she was
physically able to carry out her job functions, but was denied
employment because MHRH believed she was impaired. The
jury found in favor of Cook and awarded her $100,000 in com-
pensatory damages.94 MHRH immediately appealed the verdict
to the First Circuit.
The First Circuit recognized that "few 'perceived disability'
cases have been litigated and, consequently, decisional law in-
volving the interplay of perceived disabilities and section 504 [of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973] is hen's-teeth rare. Thus, this
case calls upon us to explore new frontiers."95 Due to the un-
contested jury instructions, which charged the jury to consider
the plaintiffs case under the first and third prongs of a per-
ceived disability claim,96 the court did not consider the second
method, dealing with an impairment that substantially limits a
person's major life activities.97 The court indicated that this sec-
ond prong arguably fell within the scope of Cook's claim but did
not determine the matter since Cook did not cross-appeal this
issue.98
92 783 F. Supp. 1569, 1571 (D.R.I. 1992).
93 There are three ways in which a person can qualify for protection on the
basis of a perceived disability claim under either the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 or
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1992. The individual must show that he or
she either:
A.) has a physical or mental impairment that does not substan-
tially limit major life activities but that is treated by a recipient [in
the case of Cook, MHRH] as constituting such a limitation;
B.) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward
such impairment; or
C.) has none of the impairments defined.., but is treated by a
recipient [MHRH] as having such an impairment.
45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j) (2) (iv) (1995); see also Cook, 10 F.3d at 22 n.4; Kramer & Mayer-
son, supra note 9, at 45.
94 Cook, 10 F.3d at 21.
95 Id. at 22.
96 See supra note 93.




The First Circuit continued its analysis, explaining the alterna-
tive showing that Cook must make in order to prevail on her
perceived disability claim. In order to satisfy the first prong,
Cook had to show that "while she had a physical or mental im-
pairment, it did not substantially limit her ability to perform ma-
jor life activities."99 If unable to satisfy the first test, Cook must
show that "she did not suffer at all from a statutorily prescribed
physical or mental impairment ... and she also had to prove
that MHRH treated her impairment (whether actual or per-
ceived) as substantially limiting one or more of her major life
activities."" °' The court reasoned that, in order for Cook to pre-
vail on appeal, the evidence only had to support one theory and
the court "believe [d] the record comfortably justifies either
finding."101
MHRH made two arguments on appeal, both of which were
rejected by the court.1 0 2 First, MHRH asserted a mutability argu-
ment. 03 MHRH claimed that Cook's morbid obesity was a mu-
table condition and, since Cook could simply lose weight and
rid herself of this disability, she should not be viewed as a handi-
capped individual protected by section 504.104 The First Circuit,
in rejecting the mutability argument, noted that this notion of
mutability is not mentioned anywhere in the statute and found
the proposition that immutability is a prerequisite for protection
very disturbing.1 0 5 "MHRH baldly asserts that... morbid obesity
is a mutable condition and that, therefore, one who suffers from
it is not handicapped within the meaning of the federal law be-
cause she can simply lose weight and rid herself of any ... disa-
bility. This suggestion is as insubstantial as a pitchman's
promise. "106 The court continued its rejection of this argument
by analyzing the logic of a perceived disability case and held that
"[slo long as the prospective employer responds to a perceived
disability in a way that makes clear that the employer regards the
condition as immutable, no more is exigible."1
0 7
99 Id. at 23 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j) (2) (iv) (A) (1995)).
100 Id. (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(iv)(A),(C) (1995)).
101 Id.
102 Cook, 10 F.3d at 23.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id, at 23 n.7.
106 Id. at 23.
107 Id. at 24.
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The court similarly rejected the second argument by MHRH.
The defendant-appellant asserted that because morbid obesity is
caused or exacerbated by voluntary conduct, it cannot qualify as
an impairment. 10 8 In dismissing this "legally faulty premise," the
court determined that the Rehabilitation Act does not suggest
that its coverage is linked to how a person became impaired. 1°9
In fact, the statute "indisputably applies to numerous conditions
that may be caused or exacerbated by voluntary conduct such as
alcoholism, AIDS, diabetes, cancer resulting from cigarette
smoking, heart disease resulting from excesses of various types,
and the like." 10
After rejecting both of MHRH's defenses, the court deter-
mined that it was appropriate for the jury to have concluded
that MHRH regarded Cook's morbid obesity as substantially lim-
iting one or more of her major life activities."' Next, the court
determined that Cook was properly categorized by the jury as
"otherwise qualified" to work as an institutional nurse for
MHRH.1 1 2 Finally, in conclusion, the First Circuit determined
that the evidence justified the jury's finding that the defendant
rejected Cook's request for employment due solely to her condi-
tion. 1 3 In affirming the trial court's decision, the court ended
by remarking that "[iin a society that all too often confuses
'slim' with 'beautiful' or 'good', morbid obesity can present for-
midable barriers to employment."" 4
In summary, the First Circuit in Cook announced a rule that
morbid obesity is a protected disability under a perceived disa-
bility theory in the Rehabilitation Act (and, presumably, under
the Americans with Disabilities Act as well). The court rejected
the defense that the plaintiffs condition was mutable because
there is nothing in the disability statutes that sets forth a require-
ment of immutability. In other words, the court's reasoning im-
plies that there are conditions that might be mutable but are
still protected disabilities under the statutes. Based on this
logic, a plaintiff might get around the ongoing debate among
experts as to whether or not obesity is mutable because, at least
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. (citations omitted).
III Id. at 25.
112 Id. at 26.
113 Id. at 28. ("MHRH has not offered a hint of any non-weight-related reason




according to the court in Cook, this is a moot point because a
condition of immutability is not required.
2. The EEOC Position in Cook
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
filed an amicus brief in support of the plaintiff's position in
Cook The EEOC urged the First Circuit to consider obesity as a
disability under both the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans
with Disabilities Act, which became effective in July 1992, after
Cook filed her claim against MHRH. 115 Further, the EEOC ar-
gued that no bright-line test for obesity should be adopted by
the courts and asserted that the issue of disability should be ex-
amined on a case-by-case basis 1 6. The EEOC conceded that
obesity is not what one would think of as a traditional disability
but it noted that obesity is a lifelong condition, even though it
might be possible for an obese person to lose weight.
1 17
Although the Cook decision was a case dealing with morbid obes-
ity, the EEOC did not maintain that protection should be lim-
ited to this context.118
3. The Cassista Decision
Although the court in Cook ruled that an employer could be
in violation of disability laws under a perceived disability theory
for considering an individual's weight when making an employ-
ment decision, the holding of the California Supreme Court in
Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc.119 seems to reflect the majority
view of the courts in the area of obesity as a handicap. In
Cassista, the California Supreme Court held that a person's
weight may not be considered a disability under California state
law unless the claimant can establish a physiological basis for the
alleged handicap.1 20
The plaintiff in Cassista was a 5'4" woman who weighed 305
pounds when she applied for one of three openings at Commu-
nity Foods, a health food store in Santa Cruz. The duties re-
quired for the position included running the cash register,
"5 See Sharlene A. McEvoy, Tipping the Scales ofJustice: Employment Discrimination
Against the Overweight, 21 SUM HUM. RTS. 24, 28 (1994).
116 See Charles T. Passaglia, Appearance Discrimination: The Evidence of the Weight,
23 COLO. LAw. 841, 843 (1993).
117 See McEvoy, supra note 115.
118 Id.
119 856 P.2d 1143 (1993) (en banc).
120 Id. at 1153.
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carrying fifty pound bags of produce, stacking thirty-five to fifty
pounds of grain, and performing various other manual labor
tasks. The plaintiff, who had previously managed a sandwich
shop and worked as an aide in a nursing home, became inter-
ested in the job because she believed the company shared her
concerns about the environment.
The first step in the hiring process for Community Foods was
a thirty minute interview. During this interview, Cassista and
members of the store discussed the job requirements and her
previous experience. She was asked if she had any physical limi-
tations which would affect her ability to do the job and Cassista
stated that she did not. Later, Cassista learned the openings had
been filled by three other candidates.
Several weeks after the initial interview, the plaintiff learned
of a fourth opening. Despite resubmitting her application, she
was informed that she had not been selected for this position
either. Cassista asked the personnel coordinator of Community
Foods how she might improve her chances for future openings.
The coordinator replied that people with more experience were
hired but admitted that there was some concern about her
weight and how this would affect her ability to meet the job
requirements.
Cassista proceeded to file a complaint with the Department of
Fair Employment and Housing (Department), alleging weight
discrimination. When the Department decided not to file a
complaint in the matter, Cassista filed suit in state court. She
alleged that she was denied employment in violation of Califor-
nia's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) because the
defendant regarded her as having a physical handicap due to
her excessive weight.
At the close of evidence, the jury returned an unanimous ver-
dict in favor of Community Foods. 121 The California Court of
Appeals, in turn, reversed the trial court's decision, holding that
the defendant considered the plaintiffs weight a physical disa-
bility, in violation of the FEHA. 122 The Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia granted review to determine whether the plaintiff
established a prima facie case for handicap discrimination
within the meaning of the FEHA.




After citing extensive authority, which included both judi-
cial 123 and legislative interpretations of federal statutes on which
the FEHA is modeled, the court concluded that obesity does not
qualify as a disability unless there is proof of a physiological
cause. 12 4 Because Cassista wholly failed to show either an actual
disorder or a perceived disability in the eyes of her prospective
employer, the court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed
the trial court's judgment for the defendant.1 25 Thus, while
weight may qualify as a protected handicap or disability within
the meaning of the FEHA, it is necessary for the plaintiff, ac-
cording to the Supreme Court of California, to establish medical
evidence which shows that a condition of excessive weight is the
result of a physiological condition and limits a major life activity.
4. State Legislation: Michigan
Potential plaintiffs should look past federal law and en-
courage states to enact legislation that protects the overweight.
Michigan is the trend setter in this area, making overweight and
obesity a protected class under its discrimination laws. 126
Michigan's Elliott-Larsen Act is "[a statute] to define civil
rights and to prohibit discriminatory practices, policies, and cus-
toms in the exercise of those rights."1 27 The Michigan law is
comprehensive in its protection against discrimination and
mandates that an employer shall not do any of the following:
a. Fail or refuse to hire or recruit, discharge, or otherwise
discriminate against an individual with respect to employment,
compensation, or a term condition, or privilege of employment,
because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, height,
weight, or marital status.
b. Limit, segregate, or classify an employee or applicant for
employment in a way that deprives or tends to deprive the em-
123 It is interesting to note that the California Supreme Court cited the trial
court's decision in Cook as support for its conclusion that obesity must be accom-
panied by other physiological disorders in order to constitute a handicap. See id.
at 1151. As seen in the First Circuit's reversal of the trial court in Cook, however,
this requirement of a physiological disorder is not necessary to protect an em-
ployee from disability discrimination. One might question whether the Califor-
nia Supreme Court would be willing to rethink its decision in Cassista given the
First Circuit's reversal in Cook, which, of course, occurred after the California
Supreme Court decided Cassista.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 1154.
126 Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MIcH. COMP. LAws § 37.2202 (1996).
127 Id. §§ 37.2101-.2205(a).
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ployee or applicant of an employment opportunity, or otherwise
adversely affects the status of an employee or applicant because
of religion, race, color, national origin, sex, height, weight, or
marital status.1 28
The law does allow an employer to apply for an exemption if the
employer makes a sufficient showing that any of the protected
classes are a bona fide occupational qualification.1 29 If the em-
ployer makes the showing that this qualification is necessary to
the normal business operations, an exemption may be
granted.' In Byrnes v. Frito-Lay, Inc.,' the district court held
that a plaintiff seeking to establish a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation based on weight and age under the Elliot-Larsen Act did
not have to prove that such illegitimate criteria were the sole
reason or even the main reason for the decision.13 2 The illegal
discrimination alleged by the plaintiff did, however, have to be
one of the deciding reasons in determining whether the plain-
tiff was hired or discharged.1 33
In Byrnes, the plaintiff, who was an overweight 34 individual,
began working for the defendant as a warehouse manager in
1970. After a few months, Byrnes was promoted to route sales-
man where he was supervised by Fred Cahill. With the support
of Cahill, Byrnes was soon promoted to district manager, despite
the fact that Cahill's supervisor, Dutch Froehlich, did not want
to promote the plaintiff because of his excessive weight. Byrnes
was transferred to Cincinnati, Ohio in 1971 and Froehlich in-
sisted that Cahill supervise Byrnes or Froehlich would fire
Byrnes because he would not lose weight. Cahill continued su-
pervising Byrnes, who became a regional manager, but Cahill's
supervisors continued to insist that the plaintiff lose weight, de-
spite the fact that he was doing a good job.
In 1988, Cahill was transferred and the plaintiff was assigned a
new supervisor, Mary Ellen Johnson. Apparently, Johnson's
management style was different from Cahill's and Byrnes be-
came irritated with his new supervisor. The plaintiff claimed
128 Id. § 37.2202(1)(a)-(b).
129 Id. § 37.2208.
130 Id.
131 811 F. Supp. 286 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
132 Id. at 291.
133 Id.
134 The court classifies Byrnes as "overweight." Id. at 292. Under the defini-
tions for overweight and obesity, however, the plaintiff's condition is more prop-
erly categorized as obesity, since he was 5'8" and weighed between 230 and 240
pounds. See discussion supra part II.A.
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that Johnson told him at an evaluation that if he wanted to ad-
vance any further with the company, he would have to lose
weight.
In September 1989, Byrnes began a medical leave of absence
at his doctor's recommendation. This leave was necessitated by
the fact that the plaintiff's blood pressure was fluctuating and
this was caused, according to Byrne's doctor, by stress. In late
1990, the plaintiff was instructed to clean out his desk because a
replacement had been hired. When asked, a representative of
the defendant said that Byrnes had not been fired but that the
position needed to be filled because the plaintiff was unable to
return to work. During all of the years of his employment, the
plaintiff was approximately 5'8" and weighed between 230 and
240 pounds. After his official termination, the plaintiff brought
an action against his employer, alleging weight discrimination
under the Elliott-Larsen Act.
After the defendant removed the action to federal court, the
district court found that the Elliott-Larsen Act adopted the fed-
eral analysis for employment discrimination cases.' 3 5 Thus, in
order to prove the prima facie case, the plaintiff must show (1)
that he is a member of a protected class; (2) that he was quali-
fied for the position; (3) that he was discharged from the job;
and (4) that he was replaced by an individual who is not a mem-
ber of the protected group.136 If the plaintiff proves the prima
facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a le-
gitimate, non-discriminatory rationale for the action taken. 137
In Byrnes, the court held that the plaintiff had failed to prove
the prima facie case.13 8 From the facts presented, the plaintiff
was unable to demonstrate that he was qualified for the position
at the time of his discharge. 3 9 In addition, the court held that
the plaintiff offered no proof that the defendant's decision to
terminate his employment was based, even partially, on his
weight condition. 140 Thus, the court granted the defendant's
motion for summary judgment, although they did not deter-
mine the showing necessary for a plaintiff to make a valid weight
discrimination claim under the Elliott-Larsen Act.14'





140 Id. at 292.
141 Id.
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Because Michigan is the sole state that has passed legislation
that specifically remedies weight-based discrimination in the em-
ployer-employee context (and it is not even clear, according to
Byrnes, exactly what a plaintiff must prove in a weight discrimina-
tion case), waiting for state legislative action will be of little help
to flight attendants who are discriminated against because of
their weight. In addition, even the "ray of hope" offered by the
Michigan law is not applicable to protect overweight and obese
passengers because these travellers fall outside the scope of the
employee-employer area. Given the state of the law today, the
best answer for both flight attendants and obese passengers ap-
pears to be to argue that weight is a handicap and deserves pro-
tection under federal laws that prohibit handicap
discrimination. Assuming, for the time being, that the courts
become more willing to follow the reasoning in Cook and classify
obesity as a handicap, there are two separate statutes that could
be asserted. For flight attendants, the answer lies in the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 4 2 and for obese passengers,
their safe haven is found in the Air Carrier Access Act
(ACAA) .143
B. FLIGHT ATTENDANTS: AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
1. History of the ADA
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973114 was enacted by Congress to
allow handicapped individuals equal access to employment op-
portunities. The Act defines a handicapped individual as "any
person who i) has a physical or mental impairment which sub-
stantially limits one or more . . . major life activities, ii) has a
record of such an impairment, or iii) is regarded as having such
an impairment."1 4 5 Further, this federal law only prohibits dis-
crimination against handicapped individuals when the activity in
question is federally funded. 46 This problematic limitation
means that the Rehabilitation Act does not extend to private or-
ganizations, which leads to only a small percentage of handi-
capped individuals falling within the Rehabilitation Act's
protection. 147
142 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
14' Air Carrier Access Act of 1986, 49 U.S.C. § 1301(3) (1994).
-" See supra note 89.
145 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1994).
14 Id. § 794.
147 Stolker, supra note 19, at 229.
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The limitations of the Rehabilitation Act demonstrated the
necessity for a comprehensive federal law to protect individuals
with disabilities from discrimination. Due to this recognized
need, President Bush signed the ADA into law on July 26,
1990.148 The ADA responded to findings that more than
43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental disa-
bilities, and the number is increasing as medical techniques al-
low the population as a whole to live longer.1 49 Congress
recognized that discrimination against people with disabilities
persists in areas such as employment, housing, public accommo-
dations, education, and transportation and individuals who have
been the subject of this discrimination have often had no legal
recourse to redress this treatment.15 ° Finally, Congress stated
that these individuals are disadvantaged based on characteristics
that are beyond their control and they have become the victims
of stereotypic assumptions that are not indicative of the individ-
ual's ability to significantly contribute to society. 15' Because of
these factors, Congress expanded the coverage of protection
against disability discrimination announced by the Rehabilita-
tion Act by passing the ADA, the provisions of which are gener-
ally applicable to all employers, employment agencies, and labor
organizations in the private spectrum. 152 Thus, the Rehabilita-
tion Act remains the disability law for the federal government
and federal contractors and the ADA covers all areas of private
employment.
2. Relevant Provisions of the ADA
The ADA prohibits discrimination "against a qualified individ-
ual with a disability. ' 153 The ADA adopted the definition of
"handicap" from the Rehabilitation Act and, essentially, set up
an alternative three-prong definition for proving that a disability
exists.1 54 As one prong of this test, the ADA protects those per-
sons "perceived" to have a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity even if the individual is
148 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
149 Id. § 12101.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id. § 12111(3).
153 Id. § 12112(a).
154 See discussion supra part V.B. 1. Just to reiterate, the ADA defines a disability
as: (1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of
the major life activities of such individual; (2) a record of such an impairment; or
(3) being regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
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not actually impaired. 155 The ADA regulations define "substan-
tially limiting" as any impairment that causes an individual to be
"unable to perform a major life activity [or] [s]ignificantly re-
strict(s) ... the condition, manner, or duration under which an
individual can perform a particular major life activity as com-
pared to ... the average person."16 In considering whether a
condition "substantially limits a major life activity," courts
should look at: (1) the nature and severity of the impairment,
(2) the duration or expected duration of the impairment, and
(3) the permanent or long term impact, or the expected perma-
nent or long term impact of, or resulting from, the
impairment. 157
In offering its interpretative guidance to the ADA, the EEOC
has helped to explain the scope of the ADA and situations
where it applies. For example, any individual who is rejected
from ajob because of the "myths, fears, and stereotypes" associ-
ated with a particular disability would be covered under the "re-
garded as" (the third prong) definition of disability." 8 In
conclusion, the EEOC states that "[i]f the employer cannot ar-
ticulate a non-discriminatory reason for the employment action,
an inference that the employer is acting on the basis of 'myth,
fear, or stereotype' may arise."159 With this statement, the EEOC
commands an investigation into whether stereotypical
155 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1) (1995).
156 Id. § 1630.20)(1).
157 Id. § 16302.2(0)(2).
158 See Kramer & Mayerson, supra note 9, at 49 (citing the EEOC clarification of
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1) in 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. at 398). The article by Kramer
and Mayerson gives a much more thorough analysis of a perceived disability
claim under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. For purposes of this Comment,
the analysis and proof models of a plaintiff's perceived disability claim will be
briefly summarized.
There are three alternative ways that a plaintiff can satisfy a perceived disability
claim. First, the plaintiff can show that he or she has a physical or mental disabil-
ity that does not substantially limit a major life activity but is treated by a covered
employer as a limitation. Kramer & Mayerson, supra note 9, at 45. Second, the
plaintiff can show that he or she has a physical or mental disability that substan-
tially limits a major life activity only because of the attitudes of others towards the
disability. Id. A final alternative for proving a perceived disability claim is for the
plaintiff to show that there is not a defined physical or mental impairment but
that he or she is treated by a covered employer as having such a substantially
limiting disability. Id. In summary, the ADA does allow for these perceived disa-
bility claims, which are provable by any of the three above models. This could





prejudices about a particular disability played a role in the em-
ployer's decision. 16°
In School Board v. Arline,16 1 a school teacher who was fired
from her job because of her susceptibility to tuberculosis
brought an action against the school district alleging that her
termination was in violation of the Rehabilitation Act. 162 Gene
Arline was fired from her job as an elementary school teacher
after she suffered her third relapse of tuberculosis within two
years. After being denied relief in an administrative hearing,
Arline filed a lawsuit alleging discrimination on the basis of a
disability. 63
After being denied relief in the district court, Arline appealed
and the court of appeals reversed, holding that Arline's condi-
tion fell within the protection of the Rehabilitation Act.1 64 The
school district appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted
certiorari. 65 The Court decided that the legislative history of
the Rehabilitation Act demonstrates that Congress intended to
extend coverage to individuals who were simply "regarded as"
having an impairment. 66 In determining that perceived disabil-
ity claims were actionable, the Court reasoned that "[s]uch an
impairment might not diminish a person's physical or mental
capabilities, but could nevertheless substantially limit that per-
son's ability to work as a result of the negative reactions of
others to the impairment."
67
3. Argument for Right Attendants Under the ADA
Since the ADA became effective, only one case, Cook, has de-
termined that a broad definition of disability includes obesity
under a perceived disability claim.168 Continuing with the as-
160 Id.
161 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
162 Again, although this case arises under the Rehabilitation Act, courts will
look to decisions based on the Rehabilitation Act as guidance for their decisions
under the ADA.
163 Airline, 480 U.S. at 276.
164 Id. at 277.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 282.
167 Id. at 283.
168 Recall that Cook was decided under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Since
Congress modeled the ADA after the Rehabilitation Act, however, the courts will
often look to past decisions under the Rehabilitation Act for guidance as to how
the ADA is to be interpreted. For a discussion of a perceived disability in general,
see supra notes 93 and 158.
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sumption that courts will become more willing to view over-
weight and obesity as a handicap in some situations, the ADA
could be the vehicle used by flight attendants to challenge any
remaining weight requirements by airlines as illegal because
they discriminate against individuals who have an actual or per-
ceived disability.
The argument for flight attendants under the ADA is fairly
easy, once the initial step of classifying obesity or being over-
weight as a handicap has been established. The second step in
the flight attendant's argument should focus on airline weight
programs and establish that any weight requirements imposed
by the employer airline consider an individual's weight in mak-
ing employment decision. If there is an applicant for a flight
attendant position who is obese and that individual is turned
down for employment in part for being too heavy, this is imper-
missible under the ADA because it takes into consideration an
actual or perceived disability. 169 The applicant would, it follows,
be allowed to file a complaint with the EEOC and, if the EEOC
decides not to pursue any action against the employer, obtain a
notice of right to sue and file a private cause of action in federal
court.
The basic framework of the above argument has failed in at
least one case in state court, but the facts of the case concerned
overweight, not obese, individuals. In Underwood v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc.,'70 the plaintiff sued her airline employer under
New York state handicap laws. Joan Underwood was employed
by the defendant airline for more than twenty years as a flight
attendant. Trans World Airlines (TWA) maintained certain
standards concerning the appearance of their flight attendants,
169 Obviously, this example sets up a best case scenario for the plaintiff, but the
employer appears to have a couple of justifications for denying employment.
First, the employer may be able to prove a valid BFOQ defense. The argument
would be that if the applicant is so obese that he or she cannot fit down the aisles
or fit through exit doors, which are clearly essential job functions for a flight
attendant, the denial of employment is justified. Second, the ADA requires an
employer to make reasonable accommodations for an individual with a handicap
as long as no undue hardship results. The employer could make a showing that it
would be unable to accommodate this applicant unless its planes were widened in
order to allow for more room, a fact which could be viewed by a trier of fact as
something that is unreasonable or poses an undue hardship and, therefore, not
required under the ADA. Thus, a defendant airline would have BFOQ and un-
due hardship as defenses and a plaintiff would necessarily have to be prepared to
counter these, because the defenses would be relevant in the context of an obese
flight attendant.
170 710 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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including guidelines for their weight. The defendant's employ-
ment manual mandated that, only after a TWA supervisor deter-
mined that excess weight detracted from an attendant's
appearance, should the provisions of the weight program be
applied. 171
On or about September 4, 1987, the plaintiff was informed by
a supervisor that she was overweight and failed to comply with
TWA's appearance standards. Underwood was placed on a for-
mal weight program and a goal weight of 142 pounds was set.
Soon after the goal weight was set, the plaintiff was informed
that she would be suspended without pay for thirty days, effec-
tive February 7, 1988, if she could not reach her assigned goal
weight by that date.
After seeking redress through internal channels and unwilling
to wait for further administrative hearings, Underwood filed a
civil lawsuit in New York state court, alleging that TWA's weight
program violated the New York State Human Rights Law. Sub-
sequently, the airline removed the action to federal court, con-
tending subject matter jurisdiction based on federal question,
since the Railway Labor Act applied and pre-empted the plain-
tiffs state law claims. The court denied the plaintiffs motion to
remand back to state court and granted the defendant's motion
to dismiss. 172
In ruling for the defendant, the court recognized that the
term disability in the New York law was "defined to include per-
sons 'clinically diagnosed' as having the 'disease of active gross
obesity.""173 The court continued, however, that the inclusion of
obesity as a disability should be interpreted narrowly and not
extend to individuals in the plaintiff's position.1 74 The differ-
171 The court noted that the formal weight program set forth in the manual
provides for a "goal weight" to be achieved by the flight attendant. Id. at 81 n.4.
This goal is calculated by taking the hiring weight and increasing it by 12%. Id.
Nevertheless, if the flight attendant is deemed satisfactory in appearance, she can
be removed from the weight program even if her weight exceeds the goal weight.
Id. at 81 n.4.
172 Id. at 85-86.
173 Id. at 84 (citing State Div. of Human Rights v. Xerox Corp., 480 N.E.2d 695
(N.Y. 1985)). In Xerox, the plaintiff was denied a position as a systems consultant
because she was obese. Apparently, the Director of Health Services for Xerox
recommended that the company refrain from hiring her because of the effect
she would have on the company's insurance program. Xerox admitted that she
was qualified and that her condition would not affect her ability to perform the
job. The court concluded that the plaintiffs obese condition was an impairment
within the meaning of the statute. Id.
174 Id. at 84.
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ence between obesity and overweight is not one of semantics,
according to the court, and it was significant that the plaintiff
did not contend that she suffered from an obese condition.
1 75
Drawing this distinction between obesity and overweight, the
court concluded that Underwood was not within the class of per-
sons the statute intended to protect.1 76 There appears, there-
fore, to be some room for interpretation as to whether a person
who has been medically diagnosed as obese would fall within
New York state handicap laws; both Underwood and Xerox indi-
cate that obese individuals would be afforded protection.
By arguing under a Cook analysis and classifying an obese con-
dition as a handicap, many applicants for flight attendant posi-
tions could seek protection under the ADA. Because the ADA
protects handicapped individuals from discrimination by em-
ployers, a person's inability to meet weight requirements im-
posed by the airline could be viewed as an employment decision
that illegally takes a disability into account. Thus, these weight
programs would become an impermissible means of measuring
an employer's ability to perform the job of flight attendant.
There are, however, a couple of problems with this argument
under the ADA. First, in both Cook and Xerox, the plaintiffs suf-
fered from a condition of morbid obesity. If the protection
under the ADA only applies to this extreme condition, flight at-
tendants are essentially back to their original position because it
appears that an employer airline could assert a valid BFOQ for
rejecting an individual who suffers from morbid obesity. The
airline would argue that the individual's condition is a serious
safety concern and the airline could probably demonstrate that
a person in this condition could not easily fit down the aisle of
the plane, much less operate the necessary emergency equip-
ment in the event there was an accident. It is not clear, how-
ever, that only a condition of morbid obesity is required for
protection under the ADA and reading Cook in this narrow way
might be an inappropriate interpretation of the court's
position. 177
A second problem with the argument by flight attendants
under the ADA is more serious because of the individuals who
would still be left unprotected. As the court in Underwood noted,
175 Id.
176 Id.
'77 In fact, in the amicus brief written by the EEOC in Cook, the agency took
the position that protection under the ADA should not be limited to conditions
of morbid obesity. See supra note 118.
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the difference between overweight and obesity is not just a mat-
ter of semantics 178 and this fact proves problematic for a large
group of persons who need protection from airline weight pro-
grams and the discrimination that follows: the overweight. If
obesity is classified as a handicap, then individuals who suffer
from obese conditions can seek redress for employer discrimina-
tion under the ADA. No court to date, however, has been will-
ing to classify individuals who are simply overweight as disabled.
An odd result, therefore, follows because obese individuals
would be allowed to challenge airline weight programs under
the ADA but the employer would have strong defenses in many,
if not all, of these situations. On the other hand, overweight
individuals would be subject to the airline's weight programs be-
cause of the lack of statutory protection, they would fail to meet
the specified weight goals, and, thus, a large number would con-
tinue to suffer from weight discrimination. In short, it is quite
possible that the entire argument about obesity as a handicap
may have little, if any, practical effect on the weight programs
that airlines have in place today.
C. OBESE PASSENGERS: THE AIR CARRIER AcCESs ACT
1. History of the ACAA
The ADA, passed in 1992, is the sweeping, broad based legisla-
tion that prohibits discrimination against disabled persons.'79
But, airlines were specifically excluded from the application of
the ADA because Congress had already passed legislation to deal
with handicapped airline travellers: the Air Carrier Access Act
of 1986 (ACAA).' 80 This statute was passed in an effort to pro-
hibit commercial air carriers from discriminating against the
millions of handicapped individuals who require air transporta-
tion every year. Senator Robert Dole, the principal sponsor of
the bill, stated that "there should be no restrictions placed upon
air travel of handicapped persons. Any restrictions that the pro-
cedures may impose must be only for safety reasons found nec-
essary by the Federal Aviation Administration."'8 1
178 Underwood, 710 F. Supp. at 84.
179 See discussion supra part V.B.
180 49 U.S.C. § 1374(c) (1994).
181 See Paul S. Dempsey, The Civil Rights of the Handicapped in Transportation: The
Americans with Disabilities Act and Related Legislation, 19 TRANsp. L.J. 309, 318 (cit-
ing 132 CONG. REc. 21,771 (Aug. 15, 1986)).
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The ACAA, in part, was enacted in an effort to overturn the
Supreme Court decision in United States Department of Transporta-
tion v. Paralyzed Veterans of America.18 2 This case dealt with sec-
tion 404 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,183 the precursor to
the ACAA, and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which re-
quired recipients of federal assistance to allow equal access to
disabled persons. 8 4 The issue in United States Department of
Transportation was whether commercial airlines are the recipi-
ents of federal financial assistance and, thus, bound by the non-
discriminatory provision of section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act. First, the Court concluded that the airport operations, not
the airport users or commercial airlines, were the recipients of
federal assistance, which was to be used for airport improve-
ments such as construction of runways and terminals. 185 Next,
the Court held that the requirements in section 504 were appli-
cable only to direct recipients and, therefore, the requirements
of section 504 did not apply to the airlines.18 6 With this reason-
ing, the Court overturned a lower court ruling and held that
commercial air carriers, because they do not receive federal
funds, fall outside the scope of section 504 and, therefore, are
essentially allowed to discriminate against the disabled. 187 In re-
sponse to this Supreme Court decision, Congress amended sec-
tion 404 of the Federal Aviation Act and enacted the ACAA,
which covers all air carriers by its provision, regardless of their
status as recipients of federal financial assistance.18 8
2. Relevant Provisions of the ACAA
The main provision of the ACAA states that "[n] o air carrier
may discriminate against any otherwise qualified handicapped
individual, by reason of such handicap, in the provision of air
transportation."18 9 With this provision, Congress recognized
that everyone deserved to be serviced in air transportation "in a
manner appropriate to their abilities." 19° Further, a "qualified
182 477 U.S. 597 (1986).
183 49 U.S.C. § 1374 (1982).
184 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
185 Department of Transp., 477 U.S. at 605.
186 Id. at 607.
187 Id. at 612.
188 See Elizabeth E. Tweedie, The Struggle for Equal Access Includes Commercial Air
Transportation: The Need for a Private Right of Action for Disabled Persons to Enforce the
Air Carrier Access Act of 1986, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1007, 1027 (1990).
189 49 U.S.C. § 1374(c)(1).
190 See Tweedie, supra note 188, at 1031 n.153.
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handicapped individual" for purposes of the ACAA is defined as
an individual who purchases a ticket, meets all reasonable con-
tract requirements for passengers, and presents himself or her-
self for travel.'91
There are several requirements that must be met in order for
an airline to be in compliance with the ACAA. No airline can
refuse transportation to an individual based on a handicap un-
less allowing the person on the plane would compromise the
overall safety of the flight.1 92 The air carrier may, however, deny
access to a flight or require a medical release from any passen-
ger with a communicable disease that is likely to spread to other
passengers.1 93 An airline may require an attendant to accom-
pany a person travelling in a stretcher or who has a mobility
impairment so severe that the individual would be unable to
evacuate the aircraft in the event of an emergency. 194 In gen-
eral, therefore, air carrier employees must provide assistance to
handicapped travellers when they enter and exit the plane and
provide transportation between gates.1 95 In short, they cannot
discriminate against disabled passengers and they must make
reasonable accommodations for these individuals.
3. Private Causes of Action Under the ACAA
"Neither the Air Carrier Access Act of 1986, nor the regula-
tions providing for its implementation, establish a private right
of action for disabled individuals to obtain compensation for al-
leged violations under the Act."' 96 Without an express cause of
action, it is not clear whether disabled travellers have access to
the courts and, if there is no opportunity to file a private cause
of action, these persons have no means of ensuring air carriers
comply with the statute. An implied cause of action under the
ACAA has been suggested as a way to offer disabled persons re-
dress in court 97 and this particular issue has been discussed in
two important cases.
191 14 C.F.R. § 382.5 (1995).
192 Id. § 382.31.
193 Id.
194 Id. § 382.35(b).
195 Id. § 382.39(a).
196 See Tweedie, supra note 188, at 1033-34.
197 See Nancy Eisenhauer, Comment, Implied Causes of Action Under Federal Stat-
utes: The Air Carriers Access Act of 1986, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 1183 (1992). In her
comment, Ms. Eisenhauer argues that Congress intended disabled individuals to
have an implied right of action under the ACAA. Using a canon of statutory
construction to interpret the ACAA, Ms. Eisenhauer says that it becomes clear
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In Shinault v. American Airlines, Inc.,1 98 the plaintiff, a
quadriplegic passenger, brought suit against American Airlines
alleging that the airline refused to let him board a flight because
he was handicapped. Shinault, a National Easter Seals Adult
Representative, was returning to Mississippi after meeting with
President Bush in Washington, D.C. earlier in the day. The
plaintiff was scheduled to connect with a flight in Nashville,
which would fly him to his final destination in Jackson, Missis-
sippi, but his flight from Washington, D.C. was delayed because
of bad weather. When the Washington, D.C. flight landed in
Nashville, Shinault asked permission to deplane immediately
but a flight attendant told him that all of the other passengers
had to exit the plane before he would be allowed to leave. Be-
cause of this delay and others caused by the airline, Shinault
missed his connection to Mississippi.
Realizing that he would have to wait for the next flight to Mis-
sissippi, Shinault asked for his personal wheelchair, but the
chair had already been placed on the original connecting flight.
The airline provided a wheelchair for Shinault which was low-
backed and had neither seat belts nor other restraining devices.
The plaintiff feared the chair would cause pressure sores, that
he might fall out of the chair, or that he would suffer a stroke
from an inability to perform his bowel program. None of these
fears of Shinault were realized, however.
Shinault sued American Airlines for injunctive relief, compen-
satory damages, emotional distress damages, and punitive dam-
ages under the ACAA, alleging that the airline discriminated
against him because he was handicapped. This discrimination,
Shinault alleged, was demonstrated by the airline refusing to let
him deplane his original flight and refusing to allow him to
board his connecting flight. The trial court granted American
Airline's motion for summary judgment because: (1) the ACAA
does not provide for recovery of emotional distress damages; (2)
the ACAA does not allow for punitive damages; and (3) the dis-
trict court cannot issue injunctive relief because the Secretary of
Transportation is charged with enforcing the ACAA.199
Shinault immediately appealed the district court's decision to
the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit noted, at the outset, that
that a private right of action and emotional distress damages are embodied in the
Act, but not punitive damages. Id. at 1207.
198 936 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1991).
199 Id. at 799.
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since this was an appeal of the granting of a summary judgment
motion, they would apply a de novo standard of review and view
all evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to Shinault.200 Next, the court determined that,
although the ACAA does not expressly provide for private causes
of action, it is appropriate to imply a cause of action under a
Cort v. Ash20 1 analysis. 2  The court held that a genuine issue of
fact existed in this case, considering the admissions by American
Airlines203 and the testimony given by Shinault, both in his an-
swers to interrogatories and in his deposition.20 4
Next, the court turned to an analysis of the remedies available
under the ACAA.2 °5 Since there is no express remedial lan-
guage in the statute, the Fifth Circuit turned to the legislative
history of the ACAA to determine the remedies that Congress
intended to provide under the ACAA.216 After examining a his-
tory of earlier efforts by Congress to prohibit discrimination by
airlines (section 404 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, for example), the
court decided that there was "no significant evidence in the leg-
islative history and in the circumstances surrounding the pas-
sage of the ACAA to indicate what types of remedies Congress
intended to provide for private litigants."2 0 7 Since there was no
persuasive legislative history on the issue of remedies, the court
looked to an established canon of statutory construction which
allows a court to apply "all necessary and appropriate
remedies." 20 8
200 Id.
201 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
202 Shinault, 936 F.2d at 800.
203 American conceded that other passengers who were on Shinault's flight
from Washington, D.C. made the connecting flight to Jackson but Shinault did
not. Id. Also, American admitted that one of its ticket agents twice extended the
jetbridge after the door to the airplane destined for Jackson was closed. Id.
Once it was extended to board additional late passengers. Id. The other instance
was to deliver additional paperwork to the captain. Id. Finally, American admit-
ted that the plane did not pull away from the gate until 3:00 p.m. (this time is
significant because Shinault, in his deposition, testified that he arrived at the gate
at 2:50 p.m. but was not allowed to board). Id.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 801.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 804.
208 Id. (citing the Supreme Court decision in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park,
Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969)).
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Finally, the court analyzed the four remedies sought by
Shinault: injunctive relief, compensatory damages, emotional
distress damages, and punitive damages. 20 9 The Fifth Circuit
concluded that the ACAA did not provide for injunctive relief in
Shinault's case because this relief is available through the De-
partment of Transportation. 21 0 The court determined that com-
pensatory and emotional distress damages are appropriate
remedies under the ACAA and the trial court was reversed on
not allowing for recovery of these damages.21 1 No decision was
reached as to whether punitive damages are available because
Shinault did not allege wanton or malicious conduct in his
complaint. 1 2
In Tallarico v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,21 3 the plaintiff was a
handicapped minor (14 years old) with cerebral palsy that im-
peded her ability to walk and talk. The plaintiff intended to fly,
unaccompanied, from her school in Texas to her home in St.
Louis, Missouri for the Thanksgiving holiday. The airline, how-
ever, would not allow her to fly home without an escort because
the ticket agent concluded that the plaintiff could not take care
of herself in an emergency and could not exit the plane quickly.
Due to this decision, the plaintiff's father was required to travel
to Houston and accompany his daughter back to St. Louis. The
father alleged that TWA violated the ACAA because TWA had
denied his daughter the right to board the airplane because of
her handicap status.214 The district court concluded that the
ACAA does imply a private cause of action and the jury awarded
damages in the amount of $80,000.215 The district court, how-
ever, granted the defendant's motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict, reducing the damage award to $1350,
which was the equivalent of the plaintiff's out-of-pocket ex-
penses." 6 The plaintiff appealed this ruling to the Eighth
Circuit.217
The Eighth Circuit determined that Tallarico, a handicapped
individual, was a member of the class of persons Congress in-
209 Id.
210 Id. at 805.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 881 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1989).






tended to protect by passing the ACAA .2 1  The court agreed
with the district court that allowing a private cause of action was
consistent with the underlying purposes of the ACAA by utiliz-
ing the same four factor analysis from Cort that was applied in
Shinault.2 19 The Eight Circuit, however, determined that the dis-
trict court erred in determining that emotional distress damages
are not available under the ACAA.22° On the issue of punitive
damages, the Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court that
the plaintiffs failed to present any evidence that would support
an award of punitives 21 Similar to the Shinault holding, the
court did not decide the issue of whether punitive damages are
available under the ACAA.222 After determining that there was
no reversible error in the district court's exclusion of certain
testimony, the Eighth Circuit held that Tallarico had stated a
claim under the ACAA and that there was sufficient evidence to
support the jury's award of compensatory damages in the
amount of $80,000.223
4. Argument for Obese Passengers Under the A CAA
Again, assuming that the courts will find an obese condition
qualifies as a valid disability, obese passengers could seek protec-
tion from airline weight discrimination under the ACAA. It
seems logical to conclude, given Shinault and Tallarico, that
these passengers would have a private cause of action to assert
the protection of this disability statute. If a court is willing to
imply a private action under the ACAA, compensatory and emo-
tional distress damages are available and punitive damages are a
possibility as well, although neither Shinault nor Tallarico de-
cided this particular issue. The ACAA would become an excel-
lent vehicle to end the weight discrimination that faces many
obese passengers and airlines would be less likely to trivialize the
rights of these passengers if they knew they could be subject to
expensive litigation and possibly large jury verdicts. As seen in
the area of flight attendants and the ADA, however, this protec-
tion would not cover overweight passengers (since an over-
weight condition would not qualify as a handicap), although it
seems plausible that these passengers would not need the statu-
218 Id. at 570.
219 Id.
2 Id. at 571.
22, Id. at 572.
222 Id.
22 Id. at 571.
19961 239
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
tory protection that obese passengers require. If a line is to be
drawn for the ACAA, it seems appropriate that it should be
drawn by affording protection to the obese and not to the over-
weight passenger, since most, if not all, overweight passengers
do not need accommodation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Weight discrimination, whether conscious or not, is prevalent
in today's society. This Comment has attempted to demonstrate
the discrimination that overweight and obese224 individuals face
in the airline industry. Title VII, the statute most often recog-
nized as prohibiting discrimination in the employment context,
does not adequately protect flight attendants from the
mandatory weight requirements of employer airlines and there
is not a statute which directly protects obese passengers. It is,
therefore, necessary to investigate novel avenues, rather than
specific, on-point statutes, which might afford protection to indi-
viduals who are subject to the biases and prejudices that others
have about overweight and obesity. The argument that seems
most logical in affording this protection is to classify obesity as a
handicap, thus affording protection under either the ADA
(flight attendants) or the ACAA (passengers).
There is a problem, however, with defining overweight and
obesity as a handicap: it stretches the definition of handicap to
its outer limits. 225 It would be unfortunate to lessen the effect
and importance of disability protection by affording protection
to untraditional handicaps because the statutes and definitions
have been stretched almost beyond recognition. 226 Because of
the struggle to afford protection to individuals who are subject
to weight-based discrimination, it is necessary to have a clear
224 As evidenced by this Comment, treating overweight and obese conditions
in the same category is troublesome because there are real differences between
these groups, the most important difference being that an overweight condition
appears more likely to be mutable than does an obese condition.
225 At least one scholar, Donald L. Bierman, seems to agree with this conclu-
sion about the "damage" that can be done to the definition of handicap if obesity
is included. "Attacking the problem through litigation based on handicap laws
has proven ineffective and is not appropriate since obesity, unaccompanied by
other physical or medical conditions, fails to satisfy the usual definitions of handi-
cap or disability." Bierman, supra note 7, at 975-76.
226 See Petersen, supra note 18, at 133 ("Recognizing obesity as a handicap may




statute that forbids considering weight as a factor in employ-
ment decisions or in providing equal service.
The easiest way to accomplish this task, at least in the employ-
ment relationship between flight attendants and airlines, is to
add one word to the language of Title VII, "weight," which
would afford protection to both the overweight and obese.22 7
The Congressional purpose in the passing of Title VII was to
eliminate discrimination in areas where there were prejudicial
stereotypes. By adding weight to the protected characteristics of
Title VII, Congress would keep with the overall purpose of the
statute and afford the necessary protection to employees like
flight attendants who are still subject to airline weight
programs.22 8
For obese passengers, the best way to handle discrimination
against these individuals is to add an explicit section in the Air
Carrier Access Act that would address the treatment of obese
passengers.2 2 This addition eliminates the difficulty an airline
227 Several other commentators have advocated a similar addition to the lan-
guage of Title VII. See, e.g., Stolker, supra note 19, at 250 ("Employment decisions
should be based on an individual's merits, competency, and skills, and not on his
or her appearance."); McEvoy, supra note 115, at 31 ("Obesity should join sex,
age, race, national origin, and religion as impermissible reasons for job bias. In a
society of many races, cultures, shapes, and sizes, how a person works not looks
should be the only criterion for employment."); Ronkin, supra note 84, at 669
("In the employment context, it seems plausible that overweight individuals
should be afforded legal redress, because employers specifically cite weight and
appearance as the reason for refusing to hire or terminating employees."); Hart-
nett, supra note 3, at 845 ("Our size and appearance, our habits and flaws, and
our choice of private pleasures have no place on our employment applications.");
Bierman, supra note 7, at 976 ("Obesity is analogous to other protected classes
and as such should be protected. This comment recommends that the appropri-
ate response to the problem is for state and federal legislative bodies to expand
current civil rights laws to include weight or obesity as protected from
discrimination.").
228 The revised text of Title VII might read something like the following: "It
shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer to refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual in
any other employment practice, because of an individual's race, color, religion,
sex, national origin, or weight." Weight would be defined as the current body
weight of an employee at the time the alleged discriminatory conduct occurred.
It should be noted that by adding "weight" to Title VII, Congress would simply be
saying that an individual's weight cannot be considered when an employer makes
an employment decision. Obviously, employers would still have valid defenses
for the decision, such as business necessity, BFOQ and non-discriminatory
rationale.
m The additional section of the Air Carrier Access Act might read something
like the following: "In addition to protecting against discrimination of any other-
wise qualified handicapped individual, by reason of such handicap, in the provi-
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might face in trying to draw a fine line between who qualifies as
obese and who is simply overweight. The problem with this sug-
gestion, however, is that it is not clear what an airline has to do
in order to reasonably accommodate the overweight or obese
passenger. Situations could develop where passengers use this
provision to require accommodations that might not be needed,
thus taking the attention and focus away from the passengers
who truly need accommodation. Maybe the best way for passen-
gers to deal with weight discrimination, as opposed to the sug-
gested addition to the ACAA, is to boycott the airlines who do
not treat overweight and obese passengers with the respect and
accommodations that they deserve as paying customers.
The notion of weight discrimination is a troubling situation
and options must be explored to eliminate the problem. This
Comment has outlined several possibilities to address discrimi-
nation in the airline industry but there are inherent weaknesses
to these suggestions. By continuing to discuss alternatives, how-
ever, an answer to end this discrimination can surely be formu-
lated, since it has been said that "[o] n the lips of the intelligent
is found wisdom." 230
sion of air transportation, this Act prohibits any air carrier from discriminating
against any otherwise qualified individual on the basis of the individual's weight."
A qualified individual would be defined as one who purchases a ticket, presents
himself or herself for travel, and meets the reasonable requirements expected of
all passengers.
230 Proverbs 11:13 (New American Catholic).
242
